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Abstract 
This article presents a defence of gender-based affirmative action programmes against 
its critiques. It starts from an overview of the history and main criticisms addressing 
affirmative action programmes, and then proposes several arguments against these 
criticisms. Several rationales are to be found at the core of this article: first, women still 
face discrimination in regard to access to education and employment. This position 
relies on the statistical data referring to both the U.S. and the E.U. Second, gender-based 
affirmative action should be treated differently than race-based affirmative action since 
women’s discrimination on the labour market stems mainly from traditional gender 
norms largely exerted within the family and exercised through state’s family policies 
(e.g. childcare policies). Third, despite the fact that the article defends gender-based 
affirmative action against the main critiques, it also argues that this measure alone is an 
inefficient method to tackle gender inequality. The article concludes that gender-based 
affirmative action programmes are not effective methods to tackle gender inequality 
because they address only one part of the problem, namely gender inequality 
encountered in the public sphere (education and employment), while completely 
ignoring family and caring responsibilities.  
 
Keywords: affirmative action, equality of opportunities, gender equality, gender quotas, 
gender mainstreaming. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper presents a defence against the main criticisms addressing 
affirmative action programmes, with a focus on gender-based affirmative 
action. The reader should note that the theoretical approach relies on both works 
from feminist political philosophy (e.g. Nancy Fraser, Martha Nussbaum, Susan 
Moller Okin, Iris Marion Young), as well as on empirical data measuring 
                                               
*  Oana Crusmac is a PhD candidate at the National University of Political Studies and 
Public Administration (SNSPA), Bucharest, Romania (oana.crusmac.14@politice.ro). 
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various aspects of gender inequality in the European Union and the United 
States of America. Another specificity and limitation of this paper is that relies 
mostly on literature on affirmative action written in the U.S.A. The article starts 
from an overview of the critiques addressing affirmative action programmes and 
then proceeds into formulating arguments in favour of gender-based affirmative 
action. As such, this paper aims to contribute to the large literature on 
affirmative action by pointing out that gender-based affirmative action should 
be treated differently than race-based affirmative action.  
This defence is based on Iris Marion Young’s work, who advocated in 
favour of affirmative action measures in order to minimize the ongoing white 
male bias of institutions and decision makers.
1
 I will also take into account 
Nancy Fraser’s point of view, who considers that affirmative action policies are 
soft measures that address only the symptoms and not the disease.
2
 Both Young 
and Fraser present complex analyses in what regards gender inequality and 
affirmative action. However, while I largely accept Young’s diagnosis and her 
critique of the myth of merit, I consider that Fraser’s advocated solution, 
namely transformative policies, is more efficient for achieving gender equality.  
The article is spit into five sections, as follows: the first section of the 
paper will outline the brief history of affirmative action policies and their scope 
as corrective measures. The second section will present the main criticisms 
directed against affirmative action and will construct a defence against them, 
applicable for both race-based and gender-based affirmative action policies. The 
third section focuses on the distinction between equal treatment and equality of 
opportunities, the former being often invoked by affirmative action opponents 
while the latter by its supporters. The fourth section presents the relationship 
between affirmative action and the labour market, with a focus on gender 
inequality as derived from traditional gender roles. Finally, the fifth section 
briefly outlines the difference between U.S. affirmative action and E.U. positive 
action: the former issues hard quota constrains, while the latter prefers only to 
issue recommendations and implicitly confers a more important role to meritocracy. 
While the article pleads in favour of affirmative action policies, it will also 
conclude that these are not sufficient in order to address current gender inequalities. 
 
 
A Brief Overview of Affirmative Action Programmes 
 
Affirmative action was firstly adopted in the United States through the 
Executive Order 10925 issued by President John F. Kennedy in 1961. This 
Executive Order demanded that government contractors “take affirmative action 
                                               
1  Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990). 
2  Nancy Fraser, “From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Post-
Socialist’ Age,” New Left Review, 212 (1997): 68-93. 
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to ensure that applicants to be employed, and employees to be treated during 
employment without taking into account race, colour, religion, or national 
origin.”3 This initial form of the document did not provide quotas or methods, 
but stressed that those who have been discriminated in the past should not 
undergo the same treatment in the future. Women were included in the target 
group of affirmative action policies only in 1967 through the Executive Order 
11375 issued by the then President Lyndon B. Johnson, through the prohibition 
on discrimination based on sex.  
According to Shaw, affirmative action is a “public or private programme 
designed to equalize the opportunities for employment or admission for 
historically disadvantaged groups by considering even those characteristics that 
have been used to deny them an equal treatment.”4 The main goal of affirmative 
action programmes is to remedy the irrational discrimination (meaning 
discrimination which is irrelevant – e.g. based on race or gender) in assessing an 
individual’s capability or value and to reconfigure the distribution of income 
and opportunities as it should have been if society was fair from a competitive 
point of view.
5
 
Affirmative action programmes consist of two main components: a 
corrective one (remediation, equalization as result), and a compensatory one. 
Both components are heavily rejected by critics. The corrective argument 
“supports the elimination of the existing biases in the hiring process” whereas 
the compensatory argument takes into account the effects of the acts of 
discrimination made in the past (negative consequences for those discriminated, 
positive outcomes for the descendants of the discriminators).
6
 I agree with 
Mosley’s highlight that compensation is justified because it is aimed at 
reinstating the opportunities which those disadvantaged were deprived from 
through long periods of discrimination and bringing them to the level where 
they could have already been in the absence of historical oppression.
7
 
Moreover, affirmative action supports the redress of prevailing exclusionary 
practices that still exist in contemporary society through specific actions such as 
affirmative and inclusive practices. The latter, inclusive, practices aim to: (a.) 
                                               
3  Office of Equal opportunity and Diversity, “A Brief History of Affirmative Action,” 
OECD website, accessed August 2, 2018, http://www.oeod.uci.edu/policies/aahistory.php. 
4  Bill Shaw, “Affirmative Action: An Ethical Evaluation,” Journal of Business Ethics 7 
(1988): 763-770. 
5  Shaw, “Affirmative Action,” 764; Richard F. America, “Affirmative Action and 
Redistributive Ethics,” Journal of Business Ethics 5 (1986): 73-77. 
6  Celia Wolf-Devine, “Preferential Policies Have Become Toxic,” in Contemporary 
Debates in Applied Ethics, ed. Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005): 59-74. 
7  Albert Mosley, “A Defense of Affirmative Action,” in Contemporary Debates in Applied 
Ethics, ed. Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Heath Wellman (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2005): 43-58. 
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extend justice towards certain target groups; (b.) redistribute society’s resources 
(jobs, higher education positions etc); (c.) justify the social sacrifices resulting from 
the redistribution of society’s resources.8 The first two points address distributive 
justice issues, whereas the third regards procedural justice. Susan Opotow considers 
that the rejection of affirmative action measures is generated by the manner in 
which its opponents position themselves to these three elements of inclusive 
practices. As such, critics start by invoking the argument that women and racial 
minorities are no longer excluded from the scope of justice. As a result, goes their 
claim, society does not need to be reconfigured. 
Opotow adds other three reasons underlying this argument of the opponents 
of affirmative action: firstly, affirmative action target groups are seen as harmful or 
in conflict with the majority group.
9
 Accepting the inclusion of some target groups 
in compensatory measures occurs after appointing responsible delegates for taking 
decisions in regards to that respective group– hence the need for representation 
quotas in decision making bodies.
10
 Opotow underlines that in cases of economic 
instability, there is a high chance that affirmative action programmes will be 
rejected on the basis of being unjust. Secondly, opponents reject affirmative action 
because they consider that it represents either an unjust, either an inefficient 
distribution of resources. Sabbagh, for example, considers that by following the 
compensatory direction we can expect that in the future new policies will emerge in 
order to redress the inequalities generated by affirmative programmes.
11
 As such, 
opponents of affirmative action measures build their argument based on two 
possible sources: they either exclude the target groups from the scope of justice, or 
they consider that the targeted groups have already achieved social parity.
12
 For 
example, Wolf-Devine relies her rejection of affirmative action for women based 
on this second argument: women have already achieved social parity.
13
 Thirdly, 
those who reject affirmative action programmes based on procedural reasons (see 
Sowell bellow) consider that these programmes will never succeed in achieving 
parity or that they are not ethical (for example the conflict between beneficiaries 
and payers presented in detail below). 
 
 
The Critiques of Affirmative Action 
 
The criticisms against affirmative action policies have been mostly built 
in relation to the reduction of race discrimination and have expanded also on 
                                               
8  Susan Opotow, “Affirmative Action, Fairness and the Scope of Justice,” Journal of Social 
Issues 52, no. 4 (1996): 19-24.    
9  Opotow, “Affirmative Action,” 21. 
10  Opotow, “Affirmative Action,” 21. 
11  Daniel Sabbagh, “Judicial Uses of Subterfuge: Affirmative Action Reconsidered,” 
Political Science Quarterly 118, no. 3 (2003): 411-436. 
12  Opotow, “Affirmative Action,” 22. 
13  Wolf-Devine, “Preferential Policies,” 59-74. 
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programmes that seek to reduce gender inequalities. However, as I will later 
show, most of these criticisms lose their validity when applied to gender-based 
affirmative action. 
The most frequent critique against affirmative action is based on its 
temporary aspect. This critique claims that lengthy past discriminations cannot 
be solved in the short present time. Thomas Sowell, one of the most known 
advocates of this aspect, considers that “a temporary program designed to 
eliminate a centuries-old condition is almost a contradiction in terms.”14 In fact, 
despite its well-defined targets in terms of time for meeting certain quantitative 
objectives, affirmative action should be defined as eternal. Sowell suggests that 
in order to prevent their “permanent” effect, affirmative action programmes 
should be limited not only in time, but also in their goals.  
The second major critique states that the beneficiaries of affirmative 
action policies are rarely the ones that have been discriminated and/or oppressed 
in the past. Dworkin opposes this argument because in his view affirmative 
action programmes should not be limited to past generations since these 
programmes are part of a “forward looking process, not a backward looking 
one.”15 Given its limitation in time, we can say that affirmative action is 
“preoccupied by the present and by eliminating any form of castes that exist in 
the present.”16 In correlation with this aspect, Goldman claims that if the 
purpose of affirmative action programmes is not to compensate for past 
injustice, but to reach impartiality and having no discrimination in the present, 
then the numerical objectives and their achievement in a given time are not only 
inconsistent as concept, but also inconsistent in practice.
17
 We can easily defend 
gender-based affirmative action both on the ground of compensating for past 
discrimination, as well as for tackling biases and discrimination encountered in 
the present, because gender discrimination is one of the oldest and most 
pervasive unjust practices encountered in the world. Social norms and societies 
have always been constructed by men in their own advantages in the form of 
traditional gender roles.  
The third important critique against affirmative action states that, even if 
women and racial minorities might deserve compensatory measures, it is unjust 
that these acts of compensation are made on the expense of white men guilty 
only of being their ancestors’ descendants. Those who raise this third criticism 
                                               
14  Thomas Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World. An Empirical Study (New York: 
Yale University Press, 2004), 6. 
15  Ronald Dworkin, “Affirmative Action: Is It Fair?,” The Journal of Blacks in Higher 
Education, no. 28 (2000): 79-88. 
16  Owen Fiss, “Affirmative Action as a Strategy of Justice,” Philosophy & Public Policy 17, 
no. 37 (1997): 38.  
17  Alan H. Goldman, “Affirmative Action,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 5, no. 2 (1976): 
178-195,  
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claim that affirmative action resembles an “institutionalized discrimination 
against white men than a program against discrimination.”18 Goldman adds that, 
although they have not participated in the blatant discrimination which occurred 
in the past, white men who suffer most from affirmative action programmes are 
those who pay the most: the compensatory measures translate into the loss of 
jobs or higher education places as they are redistributed to racial minorities or 
women. Goldman, supporting this criticism against affirmative action, portrays 
this idea as follows: the witness should not be found as guilty of a murder as the 
killer, even if he could have prevented the act by risking his own life.
19
 
However, this argument does not hold in the case of gender-based affirmative 
action: if in the case of racial minorities slavery existed and was at least 
formally abolished, we cannot say the same about the traditional family and 
traditional gender roles.
20
 
Women’s lack of opportunity to gain the same training or experience as 
men largely rests on the state’s endorsement of traditional gender roles where 
women pertain to the household and family sphere. For example, at EU level, in 
2016, only 18% of children under the age of 3 years old were enrolled in full 
time kindergartens, and 15.1% in kindergartens with part-time programme. The 
rest of 66.9% of children under the age of 3 were being raised exclusively in the 
family.
21
 The lack of equal work experience between men and women 
contributes to disparities in earnings, as mentioned above in regard to the 
gender pay gap and the pension gender gap. In 2016, the gender pay gap at EU 
level was of 16.2%.
22
 The salary pay gap contributes to the gender gap in 
pensions: in 2012, at EU level, women’s pensions were 38% smaller than 
                                               
18  Jonathan S. Leonard, “Women and Affirmative Action,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 3, no. 1 (1989): 61. 
19  Goldman, “Affirmative Action,” 192. 
20  This regards only explicit discrimination and oppression in the form of slavery, and it 
acknowledges that the aftermath of slavery is still present. I take into account the critical 
race theorists’ account (see Angela Y. Davis, “Deepening the Debate over Mass 
Incarceration,” Socialism and Democracy 28, no. 3 (2014): 15-23) who claim that slavery 
was abolished only formally in the United States of America, and that shortly after the 
abolition, slavery was re-instated through the policies of mass incarceration. I find Davis’ 
view extremely relevant as it points out to the complexity of structural racism endemic to 
the United States of America. As such, I do not claim that race-based affirmative action is 
outdated or irrelevant today just because slavery was abolished. However, this article has 
a limited purpose and aims to present a defence against criticism addressing gender-based 
affirmative action, beyond the limits of a state and its specific policies. 
21  “Children in formal childcare or education by age group and duration - % over the 
population of each age group,” Eurostat Database, accessed December 17, 2018, 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/da ta/database. 
22  “Gender pay gap in unadjusted form - % of average gross hourly earnings of men,” 
Eurostat Database, accessed December 17, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/ 
table.do?tab= table&init=1&language=en&pcode= sdg0520&plugin=1. 
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men’s.23 Data shows similar patterns also in the United States: in 2017, the 
gender pay gap within the U.S. was of 18.2%, while the pension gender gap was 
of 34.9% in 2014.
 24
 
Richard America rightly highlights one of the most important arguments 
against this third critique: he states that rejecting affirmative action by appealing 
to the “innocent payers” justification hides in fact another reason – that some 
individuals do not want to give up their benefits and privileges obtained in an 
unjust manner, received collectively as a result of past discrimination that was 
made in their name.
25
 The question thus moves from believing that it is unjust 
that today’s individuals pay for the acts of their predecessors to calling into 
question whether it is ethical for individuals to accept the benefits of the 
practices which they disapprove now but which have already been committed 
by their forerunners in their name as a group. Richard America is right to 
suggest that the third argument against affirmative action is a very strong one as 
it defends the status quo. 
These three major critiques against affirmative action are based on the 
fact that identities of the victims of discrimination and the identities of those 
who benefit from affirmative action measures do not overlap. The same holds 
for those who perpetuated discriminatory treatments in the past: they are not the 
ones who currently have to pay to remedy them.
26
 These criticisms seem to 
particularly address race-based affirmative action, which seeks to remedy the 
shortcomings of slavery for Afro-Americans in the U.S.A. In the case of gender 
discrimination, it is difficult to sustain the views expressed by these critiques.
27
 
If an accurate, in detail assessment of the responsibility of each “white, innocent 
man” for his ancestors in regards to slavery is impossible to carry out without 
violating privacy, we cannot say the same about arguments favouring gender-
based affirmative action. We can use research (such as the statistical data 
presented above) concerning income dynamics and role-sharing within family, 
as family life influences women’s earning capabilities.  
Thus, it is hard to argue that those who pay the costs or those who are 
negatively affected by the new distribution have not helped to perpetuate the 
discrimination against women. Furthermore, by strictly applying Richard 
                                               
23  European Institute for Gender Equality, “Gender gap in pensions in the EU. Research note 
to the Latvian Presidency,” (Vilnius, 2015), 21. 
24  Gender wage gap - Employees, Percentage points, 2017 or latest available,” (2018), 
OECD database, accessed December 17, 2018, https://data.oecd.org/earnwage/gender-
wage-gap.htm. OECD, “Preventing Ageing Inequality,” (Paris, OECD Publishing, 2017), 
125-126.  
25  America, “Affirmative Action,” 73-74. 
26  Fiss, “Affirmative Action,” 37. 
27  My main argument relies on the fact that we still encounter large scale gender 
discrimination in the present, a fact supported by the data briefly presented throughout the 
paper.  
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America’s opinion that an ethical programme should penalize only those that 
have received benefits from the discriminatory actions pursued by their 
predecessors, we can say that affirmative action for women has all the reasons 
to act against the heirs of the benefits of discrimination – even if assuming that 
this discrimination it is not on-going.
28
 
Race-based affirmative action policies addressed the injustice suffered 
explicitly by past generations and their current descendants who have to face the 
aftermath of slavery. In the case of gender-based affirmative action the 
beneficiaries are not always the descendants of the most oppressed women – on 
the contrary. One important critique, which raises concerns, is that the 
beneficiaries of gender-based affirmative action are very likely to be the least 
oppressed women: educated, middle class women. 
A second range of critics argue that affirmative action programmes 
promote incompetence and that this conflicts with the principle of meritocracy 
and with the principle of colour blindness. Under the principle of meritocracy, 
critics reject affirmative programmes because they exclude better prepared 
candidates and that these programmes should guarantee the “right to compete, 
not entitlement to success.”29 However, this claim is based on the false 
assumption that discrimination is absent and that the hiring and promotion 
practices are fair in general.
30
 For example, Sabbagh claims that in order to 
block the emergence of negative stereotypes, affirmative action programmes 
should be reconfigured so that the “measures involved and their anti-
meritocratic component go unnoticed.”31 Iris Marion Young and Albert Mosely 
contradict this over-sizing of merit, arguing that affirmative action is justified 
by the fact that “the selection and evaluation procedures are not necessarily 
lacking additional and irrelevant qualifications and unconscious biases.”32 If we 
add the fact that seniority offers a priority place in the selection procedure 
during employment, we thus have another argument in favour of affirmative 
action policies because they balance the fact that women do not have the same 
chances accumulating previous work experience due to factors such as 
maternity leaves or gaps in employment generated by traditional and unjust 
family obligations.  
Young considers that the main goal of affirmative action is not that of 
compensating for past discriminations, but rather of minimizing the current biases 
of institutions and of decision makers or what she calls the “the white male 
                                               
28  America, “Affirmative Action,” 74. 
29  Mosley, “A Defense,”48. 
30  Barbara Bergmann, “Does the Market for Women's Labour Need Fixing?,” The Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 3, no. 1 (1989): 53. 
31  Sabbagh, “Judicial Uses,” 420. 
32  Young, Justice, and Mosley, “A Defense,” 44. 
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bias.”33 She argues that meritocracy is a myth because most of the times superiors 
are not competent to assess individual performance, especially when the results 
are measured in companies at a team level.
34
 Moreover, the evaluation criteria are 
“normative and cultural rather than scientific and neutral.”35 The evaluation 
criteria most of the times rely less on objective work-related competences and 
more on character, behaviour, and other traits considered desirable by the 
evaluator. This stems from the fact that organizations wish to replicate their social 
and power relations. Young rejects meritocracy precisely because it leads to the 
perpetuation of relations of domination.
36
 
Nancy Fraser, on the other hand, considers that affirmative remedies for 
gender injustice as soft measures. She contrasts them with “transformative” 
remedies, which she supports.
37
 For Fraser, affirmative remedies and thus, 
affirmative action programmes, are “remedies aimed at correcting inequitable 
outcomes of social arrangements without disturbing the underlying framework 
that generates them.”38 The view she endorses supports transformative remedies 
because they aim “at correcting inequitable outcomes precisely by restructuring 
the underlying generative framework.”39 Another reason why Fraser rejects 
affirmative remedies in favour of transformative ones is the fact that the former 
have been traditionally associated with the liberal welfare state. Fraser did not 
support such adaptation to the status quo. For her, affirmative remedies “seek to 
redress end-state maldistribution, while leaving intact much of the underlying 
political-economic structure.”40 Trying to redress effects is an unsatisfactory 
goal, according to Fraser. As such, she supports transformative remedies, 
traditionally associated with socialism, which would “redress unjust distribution 
by transforming the underlying political-economic structure. By restructuring 
the relations of production, these remedies would [...] change the social division 
of labour”  and, implicitly, the gendered division of labour.41 
Leonard recalls that the meritocratic principle supports the rule of 
seniority: those with more years of experience and education are those who are 
fired last and promoted first. Affirmative action is rejected for violating this 
rule, and for supporting the employment of a larger number of under-qualified 
employees.
42
 However, this plea for meritocracy completely ignores the fact 
that, statistically, women and men do not have the same conditions for gaining 
                                               
33  Young, Justice, 198. 
34  Young, Justice, 202-203. 
35  Young, Justice, 204. 
36  Young, Justice, 212. 
37  Fraser, “From Redistribution,” 68-93. 
38  Fraser, “From Redistribution,” 82. 
39  Fraser, “From Redistribution,” 82. 
40  Fraser, “From Redistribution,” 84. 
41  Fraser, “From Redistribution,” 84. 
42  Leonard, “Women,” 72. 
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experience - for example raising children or being the exclusive responsible for 
household chores limits the accumulation of experience or education that are 
considered relevant on the labour market. 
The colour blindness principle is an ideal one, projected into the future, 
because the roles that persons of colour or women receive are generated by 
society. While opponents of affirmative programmes invoke that discrimination 
is an attribute of the past, affirmative action proponents believe that 
discrimination must not be obvious, it can also be implicitly embedded in 
traditions and social norms, even without the intent to cause negative effects on 
the subjects in question. As Winn notes, discrimination takes place both within 
and outside the work place, and the two areas are not static, but they influence 
each other.
43
 Moreover, the principle of colour blindness does not lead to justice 
and equal consideration of people because it ignores the history and capabilities 
of people, when in fact they are not equal in their lived experiences.
44
 
Despite these criticisms built around affirmative action for persons of 
colour, affirmative action programmes in the U.S.A. were more effective for 
minorities than for women, according to Leonard.
45
 This suggests that 
remedying past discriminations, although the beneficiaries are not the same as 
those subjected to slavery in the past is more acceptable than a redistribution 
focused on the present and on the future. Although she mentions differences 
between gender-based and race-based discrimination, Wolf-Devine positions 
herself at the opposite side, arguing that affirmative policies for women emerge 
because they want to eliminate traditional gender roles. Wolf-Devine considers 
that precisely such changes should not be imposed through gender-based 
affirmative action programmes: any intervention or change in how couples 
organize their private life should be strictly up to them, in her view.
46
 
Nevertheless, the statistics mentioned above regarding the percentage of EU 
children enrolled in kindergartens can be used to point out that the state is 
already intervening in how couples organise their private life, at least in what 
regards family policies and childcare.  
However, affirmative action programmes have less desirable effects even 
on their main target groups. First, as shown by Conrad Winn, such programmes 
rather tend to favour middle-class women, thus affecting working-class families 
and women with traditional roles within them. Second, affirmative action 
programmes can affect the self-image of beneficiaries, either because of the 
mechanism itself (prioritizing the access of the target group to the labour market 
and in higher education), or due to discrimination arising from such reactionary 
                                               
43  Conrad Winn, “Affirmative action for women: more than a case of simple justice,” 
Canadian Public Administration 28, no. 1 (1985): 24-46. 
44  Mosley, “A Defense,” 53. 
45  Leonard, “Women,” 74.  
46  Wolf-Devine, “Preferential Policies,” 62. 
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programmes.
47
 Moreover, affirmative action programmes could lead to a greater 
discrimination against the target group because it can be perceived, by those 
outside the target groups, as a threat in the distribution of benefits. 
The criticism of affirmative action for women should focus on limiting it 
to the public sphere, on partial interventionism and on the gap between ideal 
goals and their methods of implementation, namely through the redistribution of 
equal opportunities vs. equal redistribution or welfare. Income inequalities 
between women and men are the effect of unequal opportunities, and this is a 
structural form of injustice. Gender based affirmative action programmes can 
only ensure a few entries in domains traditionally over-represented by men. 
Nevertheless, how gender-based affirmative action policies are implemented is 
just one method among many: they address the effects first, and not the causes 
of gender inequality. For example, instead of tackling traditional gender roles 
and instead of drafting more equalitarian family policies, policy makers prefer 
to offer several entry tickets to universities of jobs where women are 
underrepresented. 
 
 
Equal Treatment versus Preferential Treatment 
 
Affirmative action programmes “do not create new jobs but address how 
existing jobs should be distributed.”48 This means transferring benefits from one 
group to another - hence the redistribution problem. While opponents of 
affirmative action such as Thomas Sowell believe that the damage done by 
previous generations cannot be changed, no matter what current generations 
will do, Bill Shaw argues that ignoring the harm done is a moral collective 
injustice.
49
 Shaw points out that in order to treat some people equally we must 
first treat them differently.
50
 This inclusion under the same umbrella of two sets 
of opposing concepts (equality/difference, positive discrimination/elimination 
of discrimination) has made affirmative action to be seen as an inconsistent and 
ambiguous concept (maybe even intentionally).
51
 
Affirmative action was often presented as the opposite of equal treatment 
(or formal equality). Equal treatment “focuses exclusively on formal rights of 
                                               
47  Mary Anne Taylor-Carter, Dennis Doverspike and Ralph Alexander, “Message Effects on 
the Perceptions of the Fairness of Gender-Based Affirmative Action: A Cognitive 
Response Theory-Based Analysis,” Social Justice Research 8, no. 3 (1995): 286-289. 
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women in paid work, and thus fails to address the root causes of gender 
inequality in informal contracts between women and men.”52 In Sen’s terms, 
equal treatment derives from formal equality, which does not take into account 
the differences between individuals.
53
 The purpose of affirmative action is not 
formal equality, but rather substantial equality, which allows preferential 
treatment. Substantial equality includes two forms: in results and in opportunity. 
Taking into consideration the criticism addressing affirmative action 
policies, we can say that these policies prioritize equality of outcomes though 
the imposed numerical quotas. According to Teresa Rees, affirmative action 
programmes emphasize equality of outcomes.
54
 Equality of opportunities 
focuses on the distribution of equal chances to achieve opportunities, thus 
allowing forms of preferential treatment for those in need. As Albert Mosley 
notes, contrary to the intentions of equality, identical treatment rather 
“perpetuates social disparities than eliminating social determined ones.”55 Thus, 
equal treatment is different from equality of opportunities and, conversely, the 
former may result in undermining the latter. This difference maintains the 
conflicting aspect between difference feminism and equality feminism.
56
 
Moreover, political intervention “is important not only to meet the needs, 
but especially to formulate these needs.”57 Focusing the discourse on equality in 
public sphere / work place determines the following effect, noted by Sen: claims 
of equality in a domain lead to anti-egalitarianism in another domain.
58
 We 
cannot ignore the fact that women are the main care-taker for dependants 
(children, elderly, people with handicaps or those with illness, and so on). Their 
care-giving work is not taken into account by society as a whole as it is made 
without pay.
59
 Moreover, argues Nussbaum, a just society must provide “care 
for those in a state of dependency without exploiting women” and without 
denying women the right to education or paid work.
60
 Susan Moller Okin, who 
criticises economists’ lack of interest on the internal distributions within the 
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family, also stresses the fact that most policies which aim to reach equality 
between men and women are focused solely on education and employment, the 
main areas of the public sphere, while completely ignoring aspects pertaining to 
the private sphere.
61
 
 
 
Gender-based Affirmative Action and the Labour Market 
 
As Goldman argues, affirmative action policies tend to “move the burden 
of (non) discrimination on employers rather than to correct statistical 
imbalances.”62 For Winn and others this is an insufficient measure because it 
does not address the factors determining the targeted inequalities.  
Labour market discrimination is not limited to women’s lack of 
employment, but it also includes the occupational segregation by gender (where 
professions generally occupied by women tend to be less paid than those 
occupied mostly by men) as well as the gender pay gap, where women have 
lower wages than men who have the same position or experience. The 
discrepancy between the incomes of men and women is most often explained by 
different levels of qualification and partly by discrimination in the workplace
 
but the comparison of earnings between men and women with the same training 
and the same position shows noticeable differences.
63
 Thus, discrimination is 
not a minor element in the labour market. Employment discrimination is often 
justified by its perpetrators by appealing to the assumption that “women have a 
lower human capital.”64 Bergmann argues that companies prefer to hire women 
precisely for this reason, as companies practice discrimination in payment, not 
in employment. The developments of the legislation on equal treatment fuelled 
the number of lawsuits initiated by women for the pay gap and, as a result, 
companies engaged in occupational segregation, meaning that women started to 
be accepted only in certain areas of the labour market, where the wages of these 
markets are much lower than typical male work domains or industries.
65
 If in a 
family the earnings of the man are noticeably much higher than those of the his 
spouse, then she will receive a double constraint to abandon paid work in favour 
of unpaid work within the household, which subsequently reduces her chances 
of succeeding in the labour market. 
Returning to the definition given by Richard F. America, if the purpose of 
affirmative action programmes is the redistribution of income and opportunities, 
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this triggers two problems. In the first place, if income equality and equal 
opportunities are two distinct purposes, then the manner in which affirmative 
action was implemented focuses only on one of two matters - income equality. 
Opportunities are either neglected or are simplified to opportunities in the 
labour market and in access to higher education. Secondly, affirmative action 
has also been called equal employment opportunity (EEO), which suggests that 
income and opportunities are not separate, but rather converge in a single 
purpose, namely wage equal opportunities. If limiting opportunities to the 
labour market could be accepted in the original form of affirmative action (as 
specified in the Executive Order 10925 from 1961), which did not include 
women among the target groups, in order to overcome gender discrimination, 
the project should be reconfigured and separately developed because reducing 
the meaning of opportunities leads to a fundamental contradiction. Women do 
not encounter the same discriminatory treatment as people of colour. If in the 
case of the latter discrimination comes from outside their own community such 
as employers, institutions etc, in contrast, women are raised and educated in a 
discriminatory environment, namely within the family. 
Conrad Winn stresses that the family influences the women’s degree of 
involvement in the labour market (e.g. women who do not have the 
responsibility for raising children are professionally successful, women in the 
labour market have fewer children), and he argues that “the family life is a 
sufficiently important factor so as to deserve separate consideration.”66 He 
rejects the approach that focuses exclusively on employment discrimination and 
considers that the main determinants of income inequality are the educational 
segregation and the unequal burdens and responsibilities resulting from raising 
children.
67
 As Ferber and Birnbaum note, the division within the household is 
determined by tradition. The weak point noticed by the two authors is the 
circularity of the explanation: “women specialize in household because they 
earn less on the labour market and they earn less on the labour market because 
they have specialized in the household.”68 
Winn proposes that the government should reduce both inequalities of 
payment between men and women as well as inequalities between women 
active on the labour market and women handling unpaid work within the 
household. Ignoring the latter, affirmative action contributes to improving the 
situation of middle class women and thus creates an unfavourable environment 
for the working class – for example a man from a the lower class and traditional 
family, the only earner, may lose his job on the basis of affirmative action 
programmes for women, while his partner, lacking experience or training cannot 
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compensate for the family’s economic unbalance, because she does not meet the 
minimum qualifications needed to enter the labour market.
69
 
In the long run, women who deal exclusively with child rearing and 
household duties will be even more disadvantaged, because their activity is not 
paid nor recognized as work experience. This can already be seen in the form of 
the pension gender gap: the EU pension gender gap was of 38% in 2012, while 
in the U.S. was of 34.9% in 2014, as mentioned above. At EU level, women 
work on average 5 years less than men, which also contributes to their lower 
pension: in 2015, men worked on average 37.9 years, while women only 32.8 
years.
70
 Moreover, according to OECD data for 2017, women’s participation on 
the labour market is lower than men’s: only 62.4% of women compared to 
72.9% of men of the working age population are active on the E.U. labour market. 
In the United States, same OECD data shows a similar pattern, with only 64.9% of 
women and 75.4% of men of the working age population in employment.
71
 
Winn supports recognizing labour within the family, and believes that it 
is unjust that women who dedicate themselves to child rearing receive less 
consideration in retirement plans, when they are the ones who “produce and 
raise the payers of taxes and pensions.”72 Moreover, the lack of part-time jobs 
polarizes women: those from the middle class voluntarily choose to be either 
full-time mothers or in full-time employment because they have the option of 
outsourcing the responsibilities of childcare by paying other women or service 
providers, while working class women often choose employment only when 
they do not have children, and when they have children are forced to become 
full-time, unpaid, housewives.  
Pascall and Lewis highlight that care work is an essential element for any 
policy model aiming to achieve gender equality.
73
 The authors advocate for an 
equal division of incomes and responsibilities of the private sphere. 
Although the state’s intervention within the family is often rejected on the 
basis of infringing the right of privacy, Richard Arneson mentions that 
among the reasons that could justify such an activity we count the fact that 
“the structure of the marriage is already set by state regulation not 
individual choice”, as well as the fact that social norms influence the course 
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of the family life and these norms can be biased at the expense of women.74 
Moreover, as interventions for the protection of children are justified, the 
state has the same interest to regulate the family life in order to protect the 
interests of children, but this must be made without neglecting the fact that 
children are predominantly raised by women, which can lead to 
unfavourable consequences for the latter.75 
 
 
The European Union Framework: Positive Action and 
Gender Mainstreaming 
 
There are two ways in which affirmative action programmes can be 
implemented: fixed quotas and employment goals. The latter lacks numerical 
targets and asks employers to make minimum efforts to hire minorities and 
women without, however, evaluating or sanctioning them.
76
 According to Bill 
Shaw, employment goals are less controversial, but it is likely that their results 
are less efficient. Wolf-Devine calls the two versions of affirmative action 
programmes “preferential affirmative action” and, namely, “procedural 
affirmative action.”77 She favours the latter as she considers that the preferential 
form with fixed quotas violates the principle of meritocracy by offering jobs to 
less prepared candidates that belong to a group that was discriminated in the 
past, and that the inclusion of a person implies the exclusion of another. This 
section of the paper focuses on the similarity between employment goals and 
EU’s gender mainstreaming policy. 
Gender mainstreaming first emerged as an official programme in 1995, 
when it was presented during the 4th Women's International Conference in 
Beijing. It was then adopted by the United Nations and the European Union.
78
 
In 1996, the European Commission defined gender mainstreaming as consisting 
of “the systematic integration of situations and priorities of women and men in 
all policies in order to promote equality between women and men.”79 As 
Woodward rightly stresses, gender equality in the EU framework refers mainly 
to equal opportunities in employment.
80
 Thus, gender mainstreaming leaves out 
other areas which are interrelated to employment inequalities between men and 
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women, such as the private area and the organisation of family, traditional 
gender roles enforced through education and culture, and so on. 
Gender mainstreaming and affirmative action can be subjected to the 
same criticism: both address solely inequalities between men and women 
encountered in the public sphere, without paying too much interest in the origin 
of these inequalities. Gender mainstreaming relies on “incorporating the gender 
perspective into all economic problems,” sharing the same interest with 
affirmative action in discrimination on the labour market.
81
 Although it is a 
newer concept, gender mainstreaming does not correct nor surpass the limits of 
affirmative action. It rather covers the same issue (economic participation), and 
furthermore facilitate that women benefit from the same conditions as men in 
the workplace. Gender mainstreaming, as well as gender-based affirmative 
action, do not question whether helping women achieve the same conditions as 
men is the best approach. This defect undermines both policies because they 
represent a Sisyphean effort. Since gender discrimination is a deeply rooted 
phenomenon, trying to tackle it solely in a field is rather inefficient. Moreover, 
both policies use as a standard template the male-defined labour market.  
A key difference between the two policies is given by the fact that if 
affirmative action is meant to be a short-term process, gender 
mainstreaming does not have time constraints for implementation or 
delivered results. This happens because, in theory, gender mainstreaming 
aims at policy transformation.82 The downfall is that without a clear agenda 
established in a timeframe, with resources and fixed goals, gender 
mainstreaming fails to be effective. While affirmative action has often clear 
numerical goals, gender mainstreaming is a flexible term without exact 
targets. The flexibility of the term allows confusion and the likelihood that 
gender mainstreaming could “become a container concept” that each user 
fills it with a different meaning.83 The fact that the legitimacy of gender 
mainstreaming has not yet been challenged can derive from not being a 
binding legislative tool and, thus, not truly affecting the distributive status 
quo, unlike affirmative programmes. 
Regarding the differences discussed between formal and substantial 
equality, the European Union adopts both approaches. But there is an essential 
difference between them in the sense that formal equality - in the form of equal 
treatment - is implemented stronger, being supported by directives, while 
affirmative action measures are supported by recommendations that do not have 
a legally binding character.  
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In this sense, Daniela Caruso highlights the difference between the 
United States’ specific affirmative action and the positive action promoted by 
the European Union. According to Caruso, the EU considers: 
 
“affirmative action as a pejorative label that refers to a broad set of practices, including 
‘hard’ methods of intervention designed to achieve fixed quotas of representation of 
minorities in education and employment, while positive action does not go that far 
because it is built on soft measures avoiding explicit quotas and it promotes 
meritocracy.”84 
 
The European Union appeals to positive action to help groups participate 
in higher education and employment but does not guarantee success as it lacks 
any numerical parameters. 
In regards to advancing gender equality between men and women, we can 
identify within the EU three approaches, namely: “the equal treatment 
perspective”, “the women's perspective”, and “the gender perspective.”85 They 
were first mentioned in 1975, in the Council Directive 75/117/EEC which 
emphasized the principle of equal pay for equal work between men and 
women.
86
 On February 6, 1976, the Council Directive 76/207/EEC was adopted, 
which emphasized the principle of equal treatment between women and men, 
referring to the process of hiring, training, promotion and working conditions.
87
 
This directive prohibited discrimination based on grounds of sex or marital 
status and required member states to ensure the legal framework for complying 
with the new rules either by amending laws that contradicted the principle of 
equal treatment, or by creating new laws to ensure compliance with the 
76/207/EEC, Art.3.2. The Directive also stated that there are allowed measures 
that promote equality of opportunities by removing existing inequalities which 
affect women’s opportunities in the work environment (Art. 2.4.). 
Besides the Article 2.4. of the Council’s Directive 76/207/EEC, which 
allowed but did not require preferential measures, positive action for women 
appeared in 1984 in the Council Recommendation 84/635/EEC - but without 
having a binding character. The preamble of this recommendation stated that 
“existing legal provisions on equal treatment [...] are inadequate for removing 
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85  Walby, The Future, 85.  
86  Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of 
the Member States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and 
women, EUR-Lex, accessed August 2, 2018, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- 
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existing inequalities if there are no parallel measures taken by governments, 
together with the industry and other bodies concerned, to counteract the adverse 
effects on women in employment which arise from social attitudes, behaviour 
and structures.”88 Article 1 argued in favour of implementing specific measures 
to eliminate or counteract the effects of prejudice against women in 
employment and encouraged the participation of women in various occupations, 
especially in sectors where they are under-represented. However, the 
recommendation did not include numerical targets. 
In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam, Art.141.4., stated that:  
 
“the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or 
adopting measures providing for specific advantages in order to make it easier for the 
under-represented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for 
disadvantages in professional careers.”89 
 
This is a reformulation of the old Article 2.4. of the 84/635/EEC. In 
general, the Treaty has focused on the elimination of discrimination based on 
sex and the promotion of equality between women and men in the labour 
market - defending “the principle of formal equality.”90 In 2004, the Council 
Directive 2004/113/EC, Art. 6 mentioned positive action in the sense described 
above: preferential treatment is not discrimination in favour of women.
91
 
However, positive action remains an optional measure, with no binding force or 
quotas to be measured and met. 
The Council Communication of 1996 introduced the concept of “gender 
mainstreaming.”92 The fact that gender mainstreaming has been frequently used 
interchangeably with equality of opportunities applied to all areas, policies, 
activities unlike the initial approach which was limited to the labour market 
suggests that it was an extension of the directives of 1975 and 1976. The 
directives mention equal treatment and equality of opportunities in the same 
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context, but the legislative texts seem to ignore the fact that the two forms of 
equality are not identical, but rather in conflict, and that only the latter 
emphasizes the equality of outcomes.  
Thus, the European Union allows positive action but does not demand it. 
The main approaches remain the prohibiting of discrimination based on sex and 
the support of the principle of equal treatment. The newer approach, gender 
mainstreaming, although present in directives, does not specify methods for this 
purpose nor does it provide penalties for the member states that do not take the 
necessary measures. As such, it is hard to assess whether gender mainstreaming 
is an effective policy.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
This article has sought to defend gender-based affirmative action against 
its main critiques. The arguments presented in favour of gender-based 
affirmative action rely on both political philosophy arguments, as well as on 
statistical data, which confirm that gender inequality is still ongoing, both in the 
E.U. and in the U.S. As such, the article underlines that one of the core criticism 
against affirmative action programmes does not hold: in what regards gender 
inequality, the source of inequality does not belong to the past. The difference 
between race-based and gender-based affirmative action programmes is that the 
first search to compensate and to redress the aftermath of slavery of Afro-
Americans and of racial segregation (Jim Crow Laws). Gender-based 
affirmative action programmes, on the other hand, seek to address mainly biases 
and discrimination against women encountered in the present, with no reference 
to a particular past context or country. As such, while the main critique against 
race-based affirmative action stresses that the slave owners from the past are not 
the ones paying for present compensation, the critique against gender-based 
affirmative action is that it undermines meritocracy. I endorsed throughout the 
paper Iris Marion Young’s position on the myth of merit, as well as her view 
that affirmative action programmes in general, both for women and Afro-
Americans, seek to tackle the ongoing white male bias.
93
 Moreover, one of the 
main arguments the paper endorses is Richard F. America’s view that 
opponents of affirmative action programmes are in fact supporters of the status 
quo which is designed to favour while men.
94
  
This study also argues in favour of treating gender-based affirmative 
action differently than race-based affirmative action. While both can be 
defended against opponents of affirmative action in general, these programmes 
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try to address inequalities that stem from different sources: women do not face 
the same discriminatory treatment as people of colour. While for African-
Americans discrimination comes mostly from outside of their community (e.g. 
employers, institutions), for women discrimination is first of all encountered in 
the private sphere: traditional gender norms exercised within the family. Further 
on, the article supports Conrad Winn’s proposal of offering separate 
consideration to the family as a triggering factor for women’s lower 
involvement on the labour market.
95
 Relevant in this regard are the data that 
show that in 2016, at E.U. level, 82% of children under the age of 3 years were 
not enrolled in full time nurseries and were cared for at home.
96
 As women 
continue to be the main caretaker for children, this leads them to work 5 years 
less than men.
97
 In time, this converts into a pension 38% smaller than men’s 
(data referring to the E.U.).
98
 Moreover, the gender pay gap in the E.U. was of 
16.2% in 2016 and of 18.2% in the U.S. in 2017.
99
 Another factor that reflects 
gender inequality is the lower employment rate of women: in 2017, both in the 
U.S. and the E.U., the participation rate in employment is 10.5% lower than 
men’s.100 
The paper also shows that gender inequality cannot be reduced solely 
through affirmative action policies.
101
 Affirmative action measures alone are 
inefficient methods to combat gender inequality because they only address 
discrimination on the labour market and in higher education. Here I construct 
my argument taking into account Nancy Fraser’s proposal for transformative 
remedies, Susan Moller Okin’s and Conrad Winn’s claims family and internal 
distributions within it are key factors to be considered when drafting measures 
aimed at gender equality. 
One of the core arguments I have advocated for throughout the article is 
that family policies that dismantle traditional gender roles in children’s rearing 
are equally important. Affirmative action programmes for women are just one 
policy among many that address gender inequalities. The reason why 
affirmative action cannot be considered an effective strategy for advancing 
gender equality is that it addresses the effects (discrimination), and ignores the 
causes (traditional gender roles). To some extent, Fraser’s critique on 
affirmative measures echoes here since policy makers prefer to offer several 
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entry tickets to universities or jobs where women are underrepresented, instead 
of tackling traditional gender roles also through equalitarian family policies. 
Lastly, the paper argues that affirmative action for women should be 
criticised by the gender equality advocates on the basis of its limitation to the 
public sphere, as it fails to take into account the connection between 
employment and education, on the one hand, and unequal burdens and 
responsibilities within the family, on the other hand. E.U. gender mainstreaming 
and U.S. affirmative action can be subjected to the same criticism: both address 
solely inequalities between men and women encountered in employment, 
without paying too much interest in the origin of these inequalities. Moreover, 
both policies use as a standard template the male-defined labour market. 
 
 
 
